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Replies to Nicholas Rescher
Uwe MEIXNER (Augsburg)
1. Rescher on collective and distributive explanations
Contrary to Rescher, I still hold the following: Given a comprehensive fact q
which is the conjunction of less comprehensive facts p, one has explained why q is
the case if one has explained why p is the case, for every fact p in the conjunction.
Such a piecemeal explanation of q may not be the best explanation of q (we do
prefer explanations “at one fell stroke”), but it certainly does explain why q is the
case. What Rescher’s integer-example and elephant-example show is that a demon­
stration that something is the case is not (not always) an explanation o f why it is the
case. What those examples, however, do not show is what Rescher wants them to
show: that collective explanation via the conjunction of all relevant distributive
explanations is not -  is never or at least not always - a why-explanation. Thus,
practical obstacles aside, one can indeed explain why every elephant has a trunk
by explaining for each elephant why it has a trunk. This remains true although,
doubtless, neither a collective nor a distributive explanation of elephantine trunk­
having is achievable by merely pointing out for each elephant (for Jumbo, Dumbo,
etc.) that it has a trunk; in that way, one merely achieves a demonstration for each
elephant that it has a trunk [not an explanation of why this is so), and therefore
merely a demonstration that every elephant has a trunk [not an explanation of why
this is so). I entirely agree with Rescher that no (why-)explanation of the fact that
every elephant has a trunk is forthcoming in the “demonstrative” way; but the point
he makes is quite beside the point at issue. Similarly, by demonstrating for every
integer that 1.5 is different from it, one demonstrates that 1.5 is not on the list of
integers; one does not automatically explain in this way why this is so. Nevertheless,
if one explains for every integer why 1.5 is different from it, then one has certainly
explained why 1.5 is not on the list of integers.
2. Rescher’s attack on traditional metaphysics
I have, I believe, already very well explained (in my first critique, 535) what I
mean by Rescher’s “(implicit) attack on traditional metaphysics (including Leibniz)”.
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I will try to make it yet clearer. First, I quote myself: “The traditional answer to the
Leibnizian Question [the answer given by both Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz him­
self] [...] is this: Contingent existence [...] finds its ultimate and complete explana­
tion in the causal agency o f an extramundanely necessarily existing supersubstantial
being,” (535) Now, Rescher thinks that this traditional answer is more or less wrong-
headed; at least, this is what the words of his “Initiativartikel” imply. In this negative
opinion of his, and not in anything else, Rescher’s attack on traditional metaphysics
consists: it is an attack precisely on the contents of that metaphysics. Contrary to
what Rescher surmises, I did not say and did not imply that he is attacking metaphy­
sics as a subject or discipline; after all, he is himself doing metaphysics by attacking
traditional metaphysics. And contrary to what Rescher surmises, I did not say and
did not imply that one cannot do metaphysics in the way Rescher does. Doubtless he
is doing metaphysics: the same thing that Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, or Leibniz
were doing; but in doing metaphysics the way he does -  regarding contents (tenets,
positions) -  Rescher is attacking traditional metaphysics (decidedly less implicitly in
his “Replies to Commentators” than in his “Initiativartikel”): the metaphysics of
Aquinas and Leibniz and other Christian theists.’ Regarding the ultimate explana­
tion of contingent existence, he thinks that he has a better answer than they have.I 2
I By “traditional metaphysics” I mean traditional metaphysics in its mainstream. I am well aware that
there are aspects of the history of Western metaphysics that do not fall within that mainstream, for ex­
ample: Neoplatonism, Spinozism, Lucretian materialism, and Schopenhauerism.
2 Rescher’s metaphysical views are not as close to Neoplatonism as they may seem: the Neoplatonic One is
not an idea and it is not a principle (not in the sense in which philosophers today, including Rescher, use
the word “principle”).
3. The central point of controversy
Rescher thinks that “what Aristotle called efficient causation” is a “productively
through materials naturally lawful modus operandi”. He adds: “Such efficient cau­
sation is a matter of world-internal operations and (as Leibniz also has it) cannot be
deployed to account for the contingent natural world itself.” (99) True, such effi­
cient causation cannot be deployed to account for the contingent natural world
itself. But Rescher’s definition of efficient causation (inspired by Kant, not by Aris­
totle) is far from compelling; it is very much ad hoc. The far better (and quite Aris­
totelian) straightforward conception of efficient causation is this: to efficiently
cause something is -  simply -  to make it be, is to make it exist, is to actualize it, is
to realize if (in one sense of the verb “realize”). Making something exist need not be
“a matter of world-internal operations”, and it is certainly no such thing when it
comes to making “the contingent natural world itself’ exist. In order to avoid quar­
relling merely over words, one might avoid the expressions “cause” and “causation”
altogether, and then ask: Is it not a legitimate metaphysical position to hold that
God made the contingent natural world exist, in other words: created it (as Leibniz
certainly believed)? It seems that Rescher allows that such a position is a legitimate
metaphysical position, a position sufficiently rational for metaphysical considera-
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tion -  alongside his own position.3 But if I understand Rescher correctly, he is also
asserting that it is a still better explanation of the natural world’s existence to make
laws and principles responsible for it rather than God (though the latter is okay if
you just cannot be as rational as others are). Coming from a philosopher whom I
thought to be a Christian, this is somewhat disappointing, at least to me. But matters
of personal faith aside: laws and principles -  whether self-subsistent or not4 -  can­
not make anything exist, least of all the contingent natural world, because they are
abstract objects.5 Since Rescher puts so much stock in contrasting elimination and
production, it must be added: laws and principles -  being abstract objects, -  cannot
eliminate anything, either. They cannot (literally) actualize the best possibility, and
they cannot (literally) eliminate the inferior possibilities from actualization. And if
they could, it would not automatically follow that the remaining best possibility is
actual (Rescher’s appeal to the logical authority of Sherlock Holmes notwithstand­
ing): after all, it seems possible that no possible world is actual. AH that laws and
principles can “do” is to be true or not true, is to describe things as they are, or not as
they are. And Rescher’s Law or Principle of Optimality just isn’t true; it does not
describe things as they are. “The road not taken” (99) by Leibniz is -  not only
theologically but also philosophically -  not the better road.
3 I am not quite sure that he does allow that much. For at one point he contrasts “the essentially theistic
stratagem of grounding contingency in the machinations of a contingency-external self-engendered
being” with “the essentially metaphysical stratagem of grounding it in the machinations of a self-subsist­
ing potency or principle” (Rescher [2017], 69). This suggests that the “theistic stratagem” is for him not a
metaphysical and, therefore, nota legitimate metaphysical position. It seems to me much more reasonable
to hold that every theistic position is a metaphysical position (but not vice versa, of course). Why exclude
theism from metaphysics?
4 Rescher (2017), 73, prefers a “seif-subsisting principle” to a “self-subsistent being” in explaining con­
tingent existence. It is unclear to me what the self-subsistence of a principle consists in. Is the proposition
that 2 + 2 = 4 a self-subsistent principle? In a (harmless) sense it is “self-subsistent”: it is necessarily true.
But this does not seem to be the sense Rescher has in mind.
5 Rescher himself writes: “[Cjonceptualization is [...] something abstract that cannot for that very reason
account for something as concrete and substantial [as] contingent existence is bound to be.” Now, not only
conceptualization but also concepts and principles are something abstract. And for “that very reason” they
cannot account for “concrete and substantial contingent existence” (78).
4. Rescher on how this world can be the best of all possible worlds
Like Leibniz in his time, Rescher is confronted with a widespread and deeply
entrenched belief that this (actual) world is not the best of all possible worlds. I
wonder how he himself can believe that this world is the best of all possible worlds.
For dispelling the rather strong impression that this world is not the best of all
possible worlds, he offers the standard, well-known considerations:
(I) What you think is best or good, need not be what really is best or good.
(II) What is best or good for a part (you and your environment) need not be best for
the whole (the cosmos).
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(III) Look at the overall picture, not at this or that local detail: overall bestness is
bought (and must be bought) by local imperfection;6 it is not possible to max­
imize to the highest possible degree every good thing at once.
If one already believes that this world is the best of all possible worlds, then these
considerations may help one to maintain this belief. But if one does not already
believe that this world is the best of all possible worlds, then considerations (I)—(III)
will be of no help for coming to this belief; for appearances are to such an extent
and degree contrary to it that even if one takes (I)—(III) into account it will still seem
(and rationally so) that this world is far from being the best of all possible worlds.
Leibniz believed that this world is (rather, must be) the best of all possible worlds
because he believed that a perfect being (an almighty, all-knowing, and perfectly
good being) created this world: the perfect being can only make the best world.
Leibniz’s reason for believing that this world is the best of all possible worlds is a
respectable reason, which, nevertheless, can hardly hold out when it comes under
fire (even if (I)—(III) are taken into account). Rescher, in contrast, believes that this
world is the best of all possible worlds because that this world is the best of all
possible ones follows from a principle he believes in. But why should we believe in
that principle? The problem is this: if B follows from A and B does not seem to be
true, then, in reason, A does not seem to be true, either. Why should we nevertheless
believe in A? Vis-à-vis the fact that this world does utterly not seem to be the best of
all possible worlds, Rescher’s Optimality Principle seems yet worse off than Leib­
niz’s God.
5. Lamenting the badness of what (its badness notwithstanding)
just has to be the best?
Rescher seriously suggests that we should accept that this world is the best of all
possible worlds “with the sorrowful lamentation that so imperfect a realm is the best
on offer” (101). But if it is really “the best on offer”, then there is no objectively
rational motive for lamentation (for then things, everything considered, simply
cannot be better than they are), although, of course, someone who is about to have
his head cut off (for example) might still -  but objectively quite irrationally: egocen-
trically -  complain. The more important rationality problem, of course, is that this
imperfect world - this crucified and dying world, without worldly (non-religious)
hope of resurrection -  is far from even seeming to be “the best on offer”. I am rather
sure that it does not seem to be “the best” to Rescher, and that it did not seem to be
“the best” to Leibniz. Yet Leibniz believed, and Rescher believes, that it is “the best”,
contrary to appearances. How can they do this? They can do this because it is in this
case, as in so many other cases, possible to adopt a position which is logically
stronger than B (B being one’s favourite counter-phenomenal assertion), a position
n Rescher writes: But of course Leibniz himself acknowledges that even the best possible world will be
imperfect.” (86)
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which will allow one -  indeed, “force” one (not against one’s will) -  to believe thatB,
although it seems to one -  even seems to one strongly, uniformly, unequivocally -
that non-B. Philosophers are especially expert in availing themselves of this “esca­
pist” option (Parmenides, it seems, discovered the method). And one thing must be
conceded: although philosophers by acting in this peculiarly irrational manner are
certainly not putting on display -  for the outside observer -  respect for the truth,
acting in that manner may actually prove to be in the service of (belief in) the truth.
After all, the truth may sometimes be quite contrary to what reason on the basis of
appearances suggests or requires. This may be so. I just cannot believe (or as Rescher
would put it: “Uwe Meixner cannot bring himself to take seriously the situation” [86])
that it is so in the case at hand: that contrary to appearances and appearance-asses­
sing reason this world is the best of all possible worlds.
6. Every world, if it is the actual world, is the best of all possible worlds?
Rescher writes: “The idea that things could be better than they are in this regard
[i. e., the supply of intelligence] is irresistibly tempting but -  as optimalists see it -
ultimately untenable.” (95) But surely Rescher is not denying that instead of this
world, Wo , another possible world, might have been the actual world (for otherwise
he is denying contingency, and the whole point of the Optimality Principle
vanishes). Suppose it had really been so: another possible world, Wi, not Wo , is the
actual world; and suppose Leibniz and Rescher exist in Wi and are just as intelligent
in W] as they are in Wo . One can count on it: as long as W! is not a downright hell
(but perhaps even then), Leibniz and Rescher would duly conclude that Wj is the
best of all possible worlds, with no serious gauging of its good points and bad points
in comparison to those of other possible worlds having been done on their parts at
all. For they reason like this: Given the truth of the Optimality Principle or, alterna­
tively, the existence of God qua perfect being, how otherwise could it be the case
that W] is actual (and actual it is, according to supposition) if not in virtue of Wi’s
being the best of all possible worlds? Leaving the author of the Optimality Principle
and his illustrious philosophical ancestor out of the picture (they were put in merely
for the sake of picturesqueness), we see: the Optimality Principle has the conse­
quence that whatever possible world is actual is also optimal. What more do we
need for being at peace with the universe? Or saying it without sarcasm: the Optim­
ality Principle is either vacuously true -  or non-vacuously false.
7. How to explain why something exists contingently
Consider the following argument:
Suppose (for reductio] that nothing exists contingently, but that it is not neces­
sary that nothing exists contingently. It is, therefore, a fact that nothing exists con­
tingently, and it follows, moreover, that that fact exists contingently. Something,
therefore, exists contingently -  contradicting the initial assumption. Thus I have
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shown via reductio ad absurdum of the opposite proposition: i f  nothing exists con­
tingently, then it is necessary that nothing exists contingently. Now, it rather seems
(it seems so overwhelmingly) that it is not necessary that nothing exists contingently.
Therefore (by modus tollens): something exists contingently.
To this explanation by logical demonstration,7 Rescher, in order to cut the line of
argumentation, might conceivably object that all facts exist necessarily (it seems to
me that he actually believes this). But his objection would have no bite, since by
“existence” I (entirely legitimately) mean actuality, and by “fact” actual (or obtain­
ing) state o f affairs. It is not true that all actual states of affairs (“facts”) are neces­
sarily actual (“exist necessarily”); for example, that Donald Trump is President of
the US in 2017 is an actual but not necessarily actual state of affairs.
7 In what sense do certain demonstrations (certain proofs] also explain what they demonstrate? - In the
same sense in which a standard demonstration of the Pythagorean Theorem also explains what it demon­
strates.
A final word: although it is according to the above argument quite unavoidable
that something exists contingently, there is still enough work to do for metaphysics
(including theistic metaphysics: theism). I exist, no doubt, contingently -  and I still
have no ultimate explanation of why I exist. Of one thing, however, I am fairly
certain: the ultimate explanation of my and of this world’s contingent existence
has nothing to do with this world’s being the best of all possible worlds -  because
this world just isn’t the best of all possible worlds.
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